

THE HONORABLE RONALD B. LEIGHTON

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U.S. DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

NICOLE and GUY MAEL, NADINE  
VIGLIANO, BRITNEY MOREA, CAROL  
CONWAY, ANGELA BERTUCCI and TINA  
WIEPERT, on behalf of themselves and all  
others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

EVANGER’S DOG AND CAT FOOD  
CO., INC., NUTRIPACK, LLC, AGAINST THE  
GRAIN PET FOODS, and SHER SERVICES  
COMPANY INCORPORATED,

Defendants.

EVANGER’S DOG AND CAT FOOD CO.,  
INC.,

Counterclaimant,

vs.

NICOLE MAEL,

Counterdefendant.

NO. 3:17-cv-05469-RBL

**PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR  
ATTORNEYS’ FEES, COSTS AND  
SERVICE AWARDS**

**Note on Motion Calendar:  
May 8, 2020, 9:30 a.m.**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

I. INTRODUCTION .....1

II. AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT .....2

    A. Class Counsel’s requested fees are reasonable.....2

        1. The lodestar method is appropriate in this statutory fee-shifting case .....3

            a. Class Counsel’s hours are reasonable.....4

            b. Class Counsel request reasonable hourly rates.....5

            c. Class Counsel’s requested fee reflects a “negative” multiplier .....6

        2. A percentage method “crosscheck” is neither required nor appropriate.....7

        3. Service awards for the Class Representatives are reasonable .....9

III. CONCLUSION .....10

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**TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**

**Page No.**

**FEDERAL CASES**

*Blum v. Stenson*,  
465 U.S. 886 (1984) .....5

*Craft v. Cnty. of San Bernardino*,  
624 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2008).....7

*Dennings v. Clearwire Corp*,  
Case No. C10-1859JLR, 2013 WL 1858797 (W.D. Wash. May 3, 2013).....7

*In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.*,  
654 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2011) .....3, 7, 8

*In re EasySaver Rewards Litig.*,  
906 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 2018) .....8

*In re Hyundai & Kia Fuel Econ. Litig.*,  
26 F.3d 539 (9th Cir. 2019) .....1, 7

*In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Sec. Litig.*,  
618 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2010) .....2, 3

*In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig.*,  
19 F.3d 1291 (9th Cir. 1994) .....3

*Moreno v. City of Sacramento*,  
534 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2008) .....4

*Pelletz v. Weyerhaeuser Co.*,  
592 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 9. 2009) .....9

*Roes, 1-2 v. SFBSC Mgt, LLC*,  
944 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2019) .....9

*Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers*,  
904 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1990) .....3

*Staton v. Boeing Co.*,  
327 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2003) .....2, 3, 9

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*Steiner v. Am. Broad. Co.*,  
248 Fed. Appx. 780 (9th Cir. 2007) .....6, 7

*Trevino v. Gates*,  
99 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 1996) .....5

*United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp.*,  
896 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1990) .....5

*Van Skike v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs*,  
557 F.3d 1041 (2009) .....5

*Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Co.*,  
901 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Cal. 1995).....6

**FEDERAL STATUTES**

28 U.S.C. § 1712(a) .....8

28 U.S.C. § 1712(b) .....8, 9

**STATE STATUTES**

73 Pa. Stat. § 201-9.2(a) .....3

815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/10a .....3

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-19 .....3

N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 .....3

RCW 19.86.090 .....3

## I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants are pet food manufacturers that sold dog food marketed as “human grade,” produced in USDA-inspected facilities or with USDA-inspected meats, and “people food for pets.” Three of these products were recalled because they contained pentobarbital. Plaintiffs allege that they paid a premium for the dog food, which sickened their pets and caused one to die. Defendants deny Plaintiffs’ allegations and have steadfastly defended their products — and the truth of their advertising — throughout the course of this litigation and during settlement negotiations with Magistrate Judge Creatura.

Class Counsel remain confident that Plaintiffs’ claims are strong. However, during settlement negotiations, Class Counsel could not ignore the risk they faced at class certification and at trial. Plaintiffs asserted claims on behalf of consumers from multiple jurisdictions across the country. At class certification, they faced the argument that choice-of-law issues would create manageability problems that do not exist in the settlement context. *In re Hyundai & Kia Fuel Econ. Litig.*, 26 F.3d 539, 563 (9th Cir. 2019). On the merits, Defendants would have argued that Plaintiffs could not prove that Defendants’ products caused their pets to become ill. Plaintiffs also would have been required to complete costly expert work in order to show that consumers paid a premium due to Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations.

Well aware of these challenges — and after several months of settlement negotiations that included three in-person mediation sessions with Judge Creatura — Class Counsel negotiated an excellent settlement that requires Defendants to pay \$545,500 into a non-reversionary fund that will provide substantial refunds to Class members who can verify purchases or costs associated with veterinarian bills from pets that experienced illness consistent with pentobarbital poisoning after consuming the recalled pet foods. Class members have the option of claiming, in lieu of a cash payment, a product certificate for three cans of Defendants’ products. To receive a product certificate, claimants do not need to provide proof of purchase. The settlement also requires Defendants to significantly change their business

1 practices. For two years, Defendants must subject their Hand-Packed Products to random  
 2 independent third-party testing, at their own expense up to \$5,000 per year, every three months  
 3 for two years. Defendants also must change their advertising so that they no longer make false  
 4 or misleading statements about their pet food including that they are human grade quality.

5 Class Counsel seek reasonable compensation for their efforts on behalf of Plaintiffs and  
 6 the Class. They request a fee award of \$295,000, which is approximately 29% percent of Class  
 7 Counsel's total lodestar. The requested fee award includes costs: Class Counsel do not seek a  
 8 separate award of the more than \$28,440 in out-of-pocket costs they incurred prosecuting this  
 9 action.<sup>1</sup> Class Counsel also seek approval of service awards for the Class Representatives that  
 10 do not exceed \$2,500 each. The requested service awards are reasonable and in line with the  
 11 Ninth Circuit's requirements for approval. For these reasons, Class Counsel's motion should be  
 12 granted.

## 13 II. AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

### 14 A. Class Counsel's requested fees are reasonable.

15 "Attorneys' fees provisions included in proposed class action settlement agreements  
 16 are, like every other aspect of such agreements, subject to the determination whether the  
 17 settlement is 'fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable.'" *Staton v. Boeing Co.*, 327 F.3d  
 18 938, 963 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)). Rule 23(h) requires that any class  
 19 member "be allowed an opportunity to object to the fee motion itself." *In re Mercury*  
 20 *Interactive Corp. Sec. Litig.*, 618 F.3d 988, 993-994 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal marks omitted).  
 21 Class Counsel are submitting their fee motion in advance of final approval, as required by *In re*  
 22 *Mercury Interactive Corp.*, and will address any objections in their motion for final approval.  
 23 This fee motion will also be posted to the settlement website not later than March 10, 2020.

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 26  
 27 <sup>1</sup> When costs are considered, Class Counsel seek a fee award of \$266,560 (\$295,000 - \$28,440  
 = \$266,560), which is less than 27% of their lodestar (\$266,560/\$1,009,017= .264).

1           Where counsel seek fees from a common fund, courts have discretion to use one of two  
2 methods to determine whether the request is reasonable: “percentage-of-the-fund” or  
3 “lodestar/multiplier.” *Id.* at 963–64; *see also In re Mercury Interactive Corp.*, 618 F.3d at 992.  
4 “Though courts have discretion to choose which calculation method they use, their discretion  
5 must be exercised so as to achieve a reasonable result.” *In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab.*  
6 *Litig.*, 654 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2011). Here, the lodestar method supports Counsel’s fee  
7 request and is the most reasonable method to use given the facts of this case.

8           1.       The lodestar method is appropriate in this statutory fee-shifting case.

9           Courts generally use the lodestar method to award fees under statutes like Washington’s  
10 CPA and the other consumer protection statutes at issue, which provide for fee shifting. *See*,  
11 *e.g.*, *Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers*, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990)  
12 (explaining that “statutory awards of attorneys’ fees are subject to ‘lodestar’ calculation  
13 procedures”); RCW 19.86.090 (providing for recovery of “actual damages sustained... together  
14 with the costs of the suit, including a reasonable attorneys’ fee”); *and see* 815 Ill. Comp. Stat.  
15 505/10a (providing that a successful plaintiff may obtain an award of attorneys’ fees); 73 Pa.  
16 Stat. § 201-9.2(a) (providing for recovery of “actual damages or one hundred dollars (\$100),  
17 whichever is greater” and that the court may also award to the plaintiff “costs and reasonable  
18 attorney fees”); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-19 (providing for an award of “reasonable attorneys’  
19 fees, filing fees and reasonable costs of suit”); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 (providing for  
20 “reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff”).

21           “Under the lodestar/multiplier method, the district court first calculates the ‘lodestar’ by  
22 multiplying the reasonable hours expended by a reasonable hourly rate.” *In re Wash. Pub.*  
23 *Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig.*, 19 F.3d 1291, 1295 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994); *see also Staton*, 327 F.3d  
24 at 965. If circumstances warrant, the court may adjust the lodestar to account for other factors  
25 which are not subsumed within it. *Staton*, 327 F.3d at 965 & n.17. The lodestar-multiplier  
26 method confirms the propriety of the requested fee here.  
27

1 a. *Class Counsel's hours are reasonable.*

2 Over the past two years, Class Counsel have spent more than 1,953 hours prosecuting  
3 this case on behalf of the Class. *See* Murray Decl. ¶ 42, Ex. 1; Sleater Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. 1.  
4 Calculated using rates consistent with prevailing market rates, counsel's lodestar is \$1,009,017.  
5 *Id.* Class Counsel spent time analyzing factual and legal issues, briefing motions, reviewing and  
6 analyzing documents and data, interviewing Class members, and preparing for and attending  
7 mediation. *Id.* Class Counsel's detailed time records document their work on the case. Murray  
8 Decl., Ex. 1; Sleater Decl., Ex. 1. Class Counsel will incur additional fees to prosecute this case  
9 through final settlement approval. Murray Decl. ¶ 40.

10 The time Class Counsel devoted to this case is reasonable. Plaintiffs faced a determined  
11 adversary represented by experienced counsel. Class Counsel prosecuted the claims at issue  
12 efficiently and effectively and made every effort to prevent the duplication of work that might  
13 have resulted from having multiple firms working on this case. Murray Decl. ¶ 20. Where  
14 duplication arguably occurred, Class Counsel have not included it in their final lodestar  
15 calculations. *See* Murray Decl., Ex. 1 (showing write offs). Knowing it was possible they  
16 would never be paid for their work, Class Counsel had no incentive to act in a manner that was  
17 anything but economical. *See Moreno v. City of Sacramento*, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir.  
18 2008) (“[L]awyers are not likely to spend unnecessary time on contingency cases in the hope of  
19 inflating their fees. The payoff is too uncertain, as to both the result and the amount of the  
20 fee.”). This case exemplifies the kind of risk Class Counsel takes in order to litigate on behalf  
21 of consumers. Because of their litigation risks and the size of the common fund, Class Counsel  
22 are seeking a fraction — approximately 29 percent — of their lodestar.

23 Class Counsel's time records demonstrate that the work for which they seek  
24 compensation was necessary to obtain the excellent result achieved in this case. Class Counsel  
25 have carefully reviewed their records and have already reduced their total hours by more than  
26 53 hours of billable time. Murray Decl. ¶ 39. Class Counsel wrote off time recorded by  
27 attorneys not primarily responsible for the case, time spent working on legal theories or briefs

1 they did not ultimately pursue, and time spent reviewing work done by junior attorneys or co-  
2 counsel. *Id.*

3 b. *Class Counsel request reasonable hourly rates.*

4 Class Counsel's hourly rates are also reasonable. In determining a reasonable rate, the  
5 court considers the "experience, skill and reputation of the attorney requesting fees." *Trevino v.*  
6 *Gates*, 99 F.3d 911, 924 (9th Cir. 1996). The court also considers "the prevailing market rates  
7 in the relevant community." *Blum v. Stenson*, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984). "The relevant  
8 community is generally defined as the forum in which the district court sits." *Van Skike v. Dir.,*  
9 *Office of Workers' Comp. Programs*, 557 F.3d 1041, 1046 (2009) (quotation marks and citation  
10 omitted). Thus, in assessing the rates requested by Class Counsel, the Court should look to  
11 market rates in the Western District of Washington. "[A]ffidavits of the plaintiffs' attorneys  
12 and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other  
13 cases are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate." *United Steelworkers of Am. v.*  
14 *Phelps Dodge Corp.*, 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990).

15 Class Counsel are experienced, highly regarded members of the bar with extensive  
16 expertise in the area of class actions and complex litigation involving consumer claims like  
17 those at issue here. *See* Murray Decl. ¶¶ 24–36; Sleater Decl. ¶¶ 2–5. Class Counsel set their  
18 rates for attorneys and staff members based on a variety of factors, including among others: the  
19 experience, skill and sophistication required for the types of legal services typically performed;  
20 the rates customarily charged in the markets where legal services are typically performed; and  
21 the experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys and staff members. Murray Decl. ¶ 43.

22 The rates charged for attorneys and staff members working on this matter range from  
23 \$100 to \$600, with the majority of the work performed by Jennifer Murray, Jessica Sleater, and  
24 Ralph Sianni at hourly rates of \$600. *See* Murray Decl., Ex. 1; Sleater Decl., Ex. 1. Courts in  
25 Washington have approved fee requests by Class Counsel based on these rates or higher rates  
26 in place at the time of the application. *See Rinky Dink v. World Business Lenders, LLC*, No.  
27

1 2:14-cv-0268-JCC, Order Granting Final Approval of Class Settlement, ECF No. 92 at 7–8  
2 (W.D. Wash. May 31, 2016) (approving partners’ rates of \$500–\$650 per hour); *Rinky Dink,*  
3 *Inc. v. Electronic Merchant Systems, Inc.*, No. C13-1347-JCC, ECF Nos. 145 and 151 (W.D.  
4 Wash. April 19, 2016) (approving hourly rates up to of \$450–\$650 for senior associates and  
5 partners); *Odom v. Microsoft Corp.*, Case No. 04-2-10618-4 SEA (Wash. Sup. Ct. King County  
6 2010) (settlement and plaintiffs’ request for fees at rates comparable to those sought here,  
7 granted on September 24, 2010 by King County Superior Court Judge Douglass North);  
8 *Zwicker v. Gen. Motors Corp.*, No. C07-0291 JCC (W.D. Wash. 2008) (approving partners’  
9 hourly rates up to \$650); *Wheeler v. NoteWorld*, No. CV-10-202-LRS (E.D. Wash. March 20,  
10 2012), ECF No. 156 (Judge Suko approving Plaintiffs’ counsel’s fee request based on rates  
11 from \$220 to \$530); *Dell v. Carideo*, No. C06-1772 JLR (W.D. Wash. 2010) (approving  
12 plaintiffs’ fee request at comparable rates to those sought here); *Khadera v. ABM Indus., Inc.*  
13 C08-0417 RSM (W.D. Wash. Oct. 2012) (same); *Arthur v. Sallie Mae, Inc.* C10-00198 JLR  
14 (Sept. 2012 W.D. Wash.) (same); *Meilleur v. AT&T Corp.* C11-01025 MJP (W.D. Wash.  
15 March 2013) (same). Class Counsel’s hourly rates are reasonable and appropriate for  
16 calculating the lodestar.

17 c. *Class Counsel’s requested fee reflects a “negative” multiplier.*

18 Class Counsel seek an award of \$295,000, based on a lodestar of \$1,009,017. Thus, the  
19 fee requested by Class Counsel already reflects a “negative” multiplier of .29 on their total  
20 lodestar incurred [ $\$295,000 \div \$1,009,017 = 0.29$ ]. The negative multiplier results in a rate that  
21 is effectively \$151 per hour [ $\$295,000 \div 1,953.55 \text{ hours} = \$151.01$ ]. The negative multiplier is  
22 likely to go down further given that Class Counsel expect to expend additional hours seeing  
23 this case through to final resolution. Murray Decl. ¶ 40.

24 Courts in the Ninth Circuit have endorsed and approved attorneys’ fee awards with  
25 multipliers well in excess of 3.5. *See Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Co.*, 901 F. Supp. 294,  
26 299 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (approving multiplier of 3.6); *Steiner v. Am. Broad. Co.*, 248 Fed. Appx.  
27

1 780, 783 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding fee award yielding multiplier of 6.85, finding that it “falls  
2 well within the range of multipliers that courts have allowed”); *Craft v. Cnty. of San*  
3 *Bernardino*, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (approving fee award yielding a  
4 multiplier of 5.2 and stating that “there is ample authority for such awards resulting in  
5 multipliers in this range or higher”). Thus, Class Counsel’s fee request reflecting a “negative”  
6 multiplier is reasonable. *See Dennings v. Clearwire Corp*, Case No. C10-1859JLR, 2013 WL  
7 1858797, at \*6 (W.D. Wash. May 3, 2013) (finding reasonable a fee request with a negative  
8 multiplier of between .92 and .98). In short, Class Counsel’s requested attorneys’ fee award is  
9 reasonable and appropriate, and should be granted.

10 2. A percentage method “crosscheck” is neither required nor appropriate.

11 The Ninth Circuit does not require district courts employing the lodestar method to  
12 perform a “crosscheck” using the percentage method. *In re Hyundai and Kia Fuel Econ. Litig.*,  
13 926 F.3d 539, 571 (9th Cir. 2019). Such a requirement makes “little logical sense,” *see id.*  
14 (quoting 2 William B. Rubenstein, *Newberg on Class Actions* § 15:92 (5th ed. 2018)), because  
15 “the lodestar method yields a fee that is presumptively reasonable.” *In re Hyundai*, 926 F.3d at  
16 571 (quotation and internal marks omitted). By contrast, the percentage method is “merely a  
17 shortcut” that may be used instead of the lodestar method, if “the benefit to the class is easily  
18 quantified.” *In re Bluetooth*, 654 F.3d at 942. Even then, the percentage method is “at best a  
19 rough approximation of a reasonable fee.” *In re Hyundai*, 926 F.3d at 571.

20 Class Counsel have achieved an excellent result for the Class. At the time this motion  
21 was filed, 4,853 Class members had submitted claims, 76 of which were verified claims for  
22 reimbursement of cash purchases totaling approximately \$29,131. The Settlement  
23 Administrator also has received 26 claims for reimbursement of veterinary bills totaling  
24 approximately \$50,000. If all claims are found valid and if the Settlement was approved today  
25 — and assuming this Court approved Class Counsel’s request for fees and service awards —  
26 these Class members would receive 100% of their verified damages (\$545,500 - \$150,000  
27

1 (admin expenses) - \$15,000 (service awards) - \$295,000 (fees and costs) = \$85,500 (Class  
2 awards), which is greater than the approximately \$79,131 in claims made to date).<sup>2</sup> By contrast,  
3 Class Counsel are requesting only a fraction — under 30% — of their lodestar.

4 Furthermore, using the percentage-of-the-fund method to calculate a fee in a settlement  
5 that provides substantial injunctive relief, in addition to significant monetary relief, is likely to  
6 result in a fee that is too low considering counsel’s success on the merits. *In re Bluetooth*, 654  
7 F.3d at 941 (the lodestar method should be used when class counsel obtains significant  
8 injunctive relief under a fee shifting statute). Here, Defendants have agreed to cease making  
9 numerous representations that Plaintiffs allege are false including that their pet food is human  
10 grade quality and pay up to \$5,000 per year for independent testing of their pet food to promote  
11 safety. This prospective relief is a significant term of the Settlement that is not easily  
12 monetized, making the percentage method difficult to apply.

13 Under the Class Action Fairness Act, a court may not consider the value of  
14 unredeemed “coupons” in calculating a reasonable fee using the percentage of the fund method.  
15 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a). The statute calls for use of the lodestar method to calculate a reasonable  
16 fee when “a portion of the recovery of the coupons is not used to determine the attorney’s fee.”  
17 28 U.S.C. § 1712(b). The product certificates available to the Class, which can be used  
18 anywhere products are sold or redeemed through Defendants directly, likely qualify as coupons  
19 under CAFA. *See In re EasySaver Rewards Litig.*, 906 F.3d 747, 755 (9th Cir. 2018) (listing  
20 factors including whether class members have to pay to obtain a product using the credit,  
21 whether it is valid only for select products or services, and the flexibility the credit provides).  
22 However, here the value conferred by any product certificate awards is in addition to the  
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24 <sup>2</sup> Substantial time remains for additional Class members to submit claims, potentially reducing  
25 the amount per Class member, but regardless it appears Class members are likely to receive a  
26 substantial refund. In addition, the veterinary bills have not been verified or audited and the  
27 Settlement Administrator is in the process of sending deficiency letters to claimants whose  
claims do not satisfy settlement requirements. Plaintiffs will provide further information on the  
claims and the average amount Class members will receive with their final approval brief.

1 \$545,500 Settlement Fund. If the coupon settlement provisions of CAFA apply, they are  
2 satisfied by Plaintiffs' counsel's request that the Court calculate a reasonable fee award using  
3 the lodestar method. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(b)(1).

4 3. Service awards for the Class Representatives are reasonable.

5 Service awards (sometimes called "incentive" awards) compensating named plaintiffs  
6 for work done on behalf of the Settlement Class are "fairly typical" in class action cases. *See*  
7 *Roes, 1-2 v. SFBSC Mgt, LLC*, 944 F.3d 1035, 1057 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting *Rodriguez v. West*  
8 *Publ'g Corp.*, 563 F.3d 948, 958 (9th Cir. 2009)); *Pelletz v. Weyerhaeuser Co.*, 592 F. Supp. 2d  
9 1322, 1329 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 9. 2009) ("The trial court has discretion to award incentives to  
10 the class representatives."). In reviewing whether an incentive award is appropriate, the court  
11 should take into account "the actions the plaintiff has taken to protect the interests of the class,  
12 the degree to which the class has benefitted from those actions, ... [and] the amount of time and  
13 effort the plaintiff expended in pursuing the litigation." *See id.* (quoting *Staton v. Boeing Co.*,  
14 327 F.3d 928, 977 (9th Cir. 2003)).

15 Here, Class Counsel ask the Court to award service payments to the Class  
16 Representatives in the amount of \$2,500 each. These awards will compensate the Class  
17 Representatives for their time and effort in stepping forward to serve as proposed class  
18 representatives, assisting in the investigation, keeping abreast of the litigation, and meeting and  
19 communicating with Class Counsel on an ongoing basis regarding the progress of the litigation,  
20 settlement efforts, and settlement terms. The requested \$2,500 awards are reasonable under the  
21 circumstances, and well in line with awards approved by federal courts in the Pacific Northwest  
22 and elsewhere. *See, e.g., Pelletz*, 592 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1329-30 & n.9 (approving \$7,500  
23 incentive awards where named plaintiffs assisted Class Counsel, responded to discovery, and  
24 reviewed settlement terms, and collecting decisions approving awards ranging from \$5,000 to  
25 \$40,000).



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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Jennifer Rust Murray, hereby certify that on March 9, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following:

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